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I. INTRODUCTION
“When the lack of legislative guidance is combined with the
inconsistent statements of the lower courts and the dodging of
the issue by the Supreme Court, the nature of the bystander
claim is far from clear.”1 Although this was written in 2005, it
is clear from cases such as Doty v. GoAuto that the nature of the
Lejeune claim, or “bystander claim” and its effect on loss of
consortium claims has led to further questions for both insureds
and insurers in Louisiana.
* J.D. candidate (May 2021) Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State
University. The author would like to thank Professor Church for his comments
throughout the writing of this note.
1. Jessica Coco, The Status of Bystander Damage Claims in Louisiana: A
Less-Than-Perfect Fit in the Tort Puzzle, 66 LA. L. REV. 261 (2005) (citing Moody
v. United Natl. Ins. Co., 657 So. 2d 236, 240 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1995) (stating that
claims under 2315.6 are derived from the bodily injury of a tort victim)).




    
          
      
        
           
        
       
          
          
        
             
     
       
        
       
       
         
             
         
         
       
        
        
       
        
         
          
   
                                                                                                         
               
             
         
          
               
      
    
368 JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES [Vol. 12
II. DOTY’S HOLDING AND REASONING
On November 16, 2015 plaintiff (Mrs. Doty) filed suit against
the driver who struck her 80-year-old husband as he was crossing 
a mall crosswalk. Plaintiff’s petition states that she heard her hus-
band cry out as he was struck, after which she turned around and 
saw him lying on the ground. Her husband’s immediate injuries
were severe, and included a fractured left foot, a concussion, and 
contusions on his legs, elbows, and arms. He was later diagnosed
with cellulitis (infection) of the leg, arm, and foot, a bladder in-
fection, anxiety, and dementia. He was also diagnosed with para-
plegia, and as a result was confined to a hospital bed for 28 days
before being transferred to a nursing home.2 
Plaintiff sued GoAuto, defendant’s liability insurer, as well as
State Farm, her own Uninsured Motorist insurer. Plaintiff alleged
that she suffered Lejeune damages, now codified under article
2315.6,3 after witnessing her husband’s accident. A Lejeune
claim, or bystander claim under article 2315.6, requires proof
that: (1) one is a member of the class to whom such a right is
granted; (2) one saw the injury-causing event; (3) the harm sus-
tained by the injured person must be such that one can reasonably 
expect a person in the claimant’s position to sustain serious men-
tal anguish or emotional distress; and (4) the mental anguish or
emotional distress must be severe, debilitating, and foreseeable.4 
In March 2016, the defendant and her liability insurer, GoAuto,
were dismissed from the suit after they settled. In January 2017,
State Farm filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that it
had paid the full $50,000 per person limit on the policy for bodily 
injury.5 The policy provided:
2. Doty v. GoAuto Ins., 251 So.3d 706, 710 (La. App. 3 Cir. 2018).
3. LA CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2315.6 (2019) (providing for recovery for se-
vere, debilitating, and foreseeable mental anguish for a certain class of persons
who view the tortious event or come upon the scene thereafter).
4. Doty, 251 So.3d 706, 714 (citing Castille v. La. Med. Mut., 150 So.3d 
614 (La. App. 3 Cir. 2014)).
5. Id.





          
       
       
         
         
        
           
           
    
     
           
      
       
 
        
          
      
       
       
       
        
         
          
         
        
      
         
       
      
          
        
   
           
                                                                                                         
       
      
    
3692019] DOTY V. GOAUTO
Limits
a. The most we will pay for all damages resulting from bod-
ily injury to any one insured injured in any one accident, in-
cluding all damages sustained by other insureds as a result
of that bodily injury, is the lesser of:
(1) the amount of all damages resulting from that bodily in-
jury reduced by the sum of all payments for damages result-
ing from that bodily injury made by or on behalf of any per-
son or organization who is or may be held legally liable for
that bodily injury; or
(2) the limit shown under ‘Each Person.’
b. Subject to a. above, the most we will pay for all damages
resulting from bodily injury to two or more insureds injured 
in the same accident is the limit shown under ‘Each Acci-
dent.’6 
State Farm contended that plaintiff’s Lejeune claim was limited
under the single-per-person limit, because it was a result of her
husband’s bodily injury. Plaintiff relied upon the language in
Crabtree in her opposition, which allowed for recovery of a
Lejeune claim under a separate per-person limit. Defendant’s mo-
tion was denied. The trial court awarded plaintiff $50,000 in gen-
eral damages (subject to the per-accident limit), a $25,000 penalty
for State Farm’s failure to pay UM claim within 30 days of receipt
of written proof, and attorney’s fees as well as court costs.7 On
appeal, State Farm alleged that (1) the trial erred in denying its
motion for summary judgment, (2) the plaintiff’s claim met the re-
quirements established in Lejeune, (3) the plaintiff’s award was
excessive and (4) the court erred in awarding attorney’s fees. The
Third Circuit affirmed the decision of the trial court and awarded
plaintiff additional costs of the appeal.8 
The nature of the Lejeune claim and whether a Lejeune claim
constitutes a separate bodily injury for the purposes of coverage
under an insurance policy has caused much confusion in jurispru-
dence. In this case, on appeal, the court held that Ms. Doty met the
6. Id. (emphasis in original).
7. Id. at 710-711.
8. Id.




         
        
       
       
           
       
          
         
          
         
        
        
        
          
         
          
        
       
          
        
       
      
       
         
         
           
       
         
       
        
       
                                                                                                         
      
      
      
    
        
       
370 JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES [Vol. 12
requirements for a Lejeune claim. The court stated that the require-
ments of article 2315.6, when read together, “suggest a need for tem-
poral proximity between the tortious event” and the harm.9 The
court stated that the standard of the perceived injuries are superim-
posed onto the victim, in this case, her husband. Due to his age,
plaintiff’s shock, and the tire tracks and impression on her husband’s
leg, she met the requirements.10 Further, the award was not exces-
sive.11 The court stated several reasons for this, including the fact
that the plaintiff lost ten pounds after the accident due to anxiety and
stress and the fact that she declined an ambulance for her husband 
due to her shock. In sum, her physical symptoms helped to prove
her shock. Interestingly, the court notes that:
Mrs. Doty’s love and affection for husband was so great that
never left her husband’s side while he was at St. Pat-
rick’s . . . . He stayed in St. Patrick’s twenty-eight
days . . . when he was transferred to Resthaven Nursing
Home. While her actions, themselves, are not factors in 
Lejeune damages, they demonstrate the love and affection 
she has for her husband. These facts bolster the finding of
the trial court that she suffered extreme distress seeing him
lying in the road face down with tire marks across his legs
just after hearing the accident happen.12 
As Judge Gremillion’s concurrence points out, there are is-
sues with this logic. In this case, the plaintiff’s damages needed 
to be carefully separated because State Farm’s tender of non-
Lejeune damages had been extinguished by its tender of its limits
to the plaintiff.13 The “non-Lejeune damages” are loss-of-consor-
tium claims. Loss-of-consortium claims, or loss of sex, society,
service, and support are separate and distinct from Lejeune
claims.14 As stated in Ferrell v. Fireman’s Fund Insurance, loss-
of-consortium claims are typically subject to a single-person 
9. Id. at 713.
10. Id. at 714.
11. Id. at 715.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 718-719 (Gremillion, J., concurring).
14. Id. at 719.




        
          
            
      
 
         
        
          
          
      
       
           
       
          
         
           
      
         
      
       
          
         
           
                                                                                                         
             
                
          
        
                
             
        
         
       
       
       
                
        
     
             
         
3712019] DOTY V. GOAUTO
limit,15 due to the fact that they have been held to be “derivative”
in nature.16 Put another way, “a loss of consortium claim is a
derivative claim of the primary victim’s injuries . . . . The deriv-
ative claim does not come into existence until someone else is
injured.”17 
Judge Gremillion notes that the court relies on several fac-
tors, including plaintiff’s distress over her husband’s ongoing
medical issues before he was treated, and his lengthy stays in
the hospital as well as the rehab facility.18 These are factors that
point to loss-of-consortium claims, not necessarily Lejeune
claims, which only encompass immediate shock of witnessing
the accident.19 Thus, part of her claims should have been subject
to the single per-person limit on recovery.20 
As the concurrence notes, the Court of Appeal confuses the
Lejeune claim requirements and evidence of loss of consortium,
committing legal error.21 As a result, she is awarded in excess,
because the loss-of-consortium claims are “derivative” and thus
subject to a per-person limit, while the Lejeune claim for wit-
nessing the accident constitutes its own bodily injury under the
per-accident limit. Judge Gremillion bolsters this argument by
citing similar cases with lower damages,22 and also notes that
Ms. Doty was not treated or diagnosed with any serious mental
illness or issues after the accident.23 He notes that the legislature clearly 
15. Ferrell v. Fireman’s Fund Insurance, 696 So.2d 569, 577 (La. 1997).
16. Coco, supra note 1, at 262 (citing FRANK L. MARAIST & THOMAS C.
GALLIGAN, LOUISIANA TORT LAW § 15-2 at 101 (Mitchie 1996)). The importance
in this distinction lies in what limits will apply in the policy.
17. Crabtree v. State Farm Ins. Co., 632 So.2d 736, 740 (La 1994) (quoting
Shepard v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 545 So.2d 624, 629 (La. App.
4th Cir.), writ denied, 550 So.2d 627, 628 (La. 1989)).
18. Doty, 251 So.3d 706, 719 (Gremillion, J., concurring).
19. Id. at 720.
20. Id. at 719.
21. Id. at 720.
22. See Granger v. United Home Health Care, 145 So.3d 1071 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 2014) (nurse who witnessed her husband’s overdose and was diagnosed with 
post-traumatic stress disorder was awarded $1,000).
23. Doty, 251 So.3d 706, 719 (Gremillion, J., stating that while he doubts
Ms. Doty suffered severe enough mental anguish, jurisprudence has suggested




          
           
 
         
          
            
             
        
          
           
           
            
           
         
         
             
          
        
          
           
           
            
             
                                                                                                         
           
         
        
        
      
             
        
            
     
            
           
            
 
      
372 JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES [Vol. 12
intended for article 2315.6 to compensate for immediate harm that is
severe and apparent, but not to compensate for normal anguish and dis-
tress.24 
Additionally, although the concurrence does not address this, one
element required for an article 2315.625 Lejeune claim is that the person
fit a certain class of persons. These classes of persons are logically al-
lowed to collect because their damages will be large due to their love
and affection for the victim. Therefore, plaintiff’s subsequent suffering 
as she stayed with her husband should not have been considered, be-
cause she already fit the class of persons under article 2315.6, who are
essentially presumed to have love and affection for the victim. The
court did not need to consider further duplicative proof of her love and
affection. Instead, the immediateness of the shock should have been the
other consideration in deciding what amount to award.
III. DID DOTY CLARIFY THE NATURE OF THE LEJEUNE CLAIM?
A more glaring issue in this case is the categorization of Lejeune
claims as physical bodily injury under the policy, as well as the impli-
cations on the categorization of loss-of-consortium claims. Article
2315.6(A) states that: “The following persons who view an event caus-
ing injury to another person, or who come upon the scene thereafter,
may recover for mental anguish or distress that they suffer as a result
of the other person’s injury.”26 In reading this in pari materia with the
language of the policy in Doty, it seems as though the Lejeune damages
that psychological diagnosis is not dispositive. Given the abuse of discretion
standard, he agrees with the court in this respect) (also citing Dickerson v. Laf-
ferty, 750 So.2d 432, where a child who witnessed accident was not diagnosed
with any mental illness, phobia, or other disorder).
24. Id. at 717.
25. LA CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2315.6 (2019) allows recovery for:
(1) The spouse, child or children, and grandchild or grandchildren of the
injured person, or either the spouse, the child or children, or the grand-
child or grandchildren of the injured person.
(2) The father and mother of the injured person, or either of them.
(3) The brothers and sisters of the injured person or any of them.
(4) The grandfather and grandmother of the injured person, or either of
them.
26. Id. (emphasis added).




        
        
         
        
     
       
      
      
       
        
  
          
          
        
         
         
        
      
          
      
        
     
          
                                                                                                         
              
           
             
                
             
         
          
            
            
             
        
       
3732019] DOTY V. GOAUTO
would constitute damages that “result from” the damages sustained
by one person in an accident. Thus, it would be logical to conclude
from strict statutory construction that Lejeune claims are ones that
would be subject to a single-person limit, and the plaintiff in Doty
would have been limited in recovery to the single-person limit, be-
cause of the “resulting from” language. Further, article 2315.6 de-
fines Lejeune claims as mental-anguish claims, which are techni-
cally not “physical bodily injuries” from a strict definition stand-
point. The policy in this case defined bodily injury as “a physical
bodily injury to a person and sickness, disease, or death that results
from it.”
However, relying on previous case law, the Doty court ruled that
the Lejeune claim was its own separate bodily injury subject to the
per-accident limit.27 The confusion on this issue is emphasized in
Judge Gremillion’s concurrence, in which he dissents from the hold-
ing that the failure to pay was arbitrary and capricious: “State Farm
should not be punished for contesting coverage in this case, given
the ‘evolving’ case law in this area.”28 
A. Are Lejeune Claims Distinct due to “Temporal Proximity” to
the Accident, Physical Nature, or Both?
Legal scholars have articulated that there is a distinction be-
tween Lejeune claims and loss-of-consortium claims because 
there exists “an independent duty to protect a plaintiff from mental
27. Doty, 251 So.3d 706 (citing to Crabtree, 632 So.2d 736). The court relies
on the holding in Crabree, in which a Lejeune claim was subject to the per-acci-
dent limit in part due to the ambiguities in the policy. Interestingly, Justice Victory
dissents in Hill v. Shelter Ins. Co., 935 So.2d 691, 696 (La. 2006) for the same
reasons given above. He states that he would overrule Crabtree, because the policy
clearly defines “bodily injury” to one person to include all injury and damages to
others resulting from this bodily injury. Regardless of whether the mental anguish
as defined by Crabtree is its own separate injury, it is still included. He reasons
that the Crabtree court ignores the word “all.” Considering Doty’s definition of
bodily injury is physical bodily injury and all sickness, disease, or death that re-
sults in it, I would agree with this logic.
28. Id. at 724.




           
       
            
            
           
            
        
         
         
    
       
     
         
      
       
      
         
        
      
      
           
           
         
             
          
     
           
                                                                                                         
                
    
         
                
              
 
         
      
    
      
    
      
374 JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES [Vol. 12
anguish damages occasioned by the injury to a third person.”29 Louisiana
courts, however, have resolved the issue based on whether the language 
of the policy is ambiguous, on the proximity to the accident, and on the
physical nature of a Lejeune claim.30 In Crabtree, the primary case upon
which Doty relies,31 the court held that plaintiff’s Lejeune claim was a 
bodily injury that was subject to the per-accident limit in the policy be-
cause “bodily injury” was vaguely defined.32 The court utilized the
standard three-step approach for analyzing an insurance policy:
(1) if the words of the policy are clear and explicit and lead 
to no absurd consequences, no further interpretation of the
policy is necessary; (2) an insurance policy should not be
interpreted in an unreasonable or strained manner so as to 
enlarge or restrict its provisions beyond what is reasonably
contemplated by its terms or so as to achieve an absurd con-
clusion; and (3) the policy should be construed as a whole
and one portion thereof should not be construed separately 
at the expense of disregarding the other.33 If after applying
the other general rules of construction an ambiguity remains,
the ambiguous provision is to be construed against the in-
surer and in favor of the insured.34 
Crabtree concluded that the mental anguish of a Lejeune claim was
a bodily injury under the policy, in part because the limiting word 
“physical” was not included.35 However, the court contradicts itself in
dicta when it states that the essence of the Lejeune tort claim is shock,
which can manifest itself physically.36 Further, “there is no bright-line
distinction between ‘physical’ and ‘mental’ injuries, either in medi-
cine or law.”37 Thus, the presence of the word “physical” should not
29. Coco, supra note 1, at 269 (citing Lejeune v. Rayne Branch Hosp., 556
So.2d 559 (La. 1990)).
30. See Crabtree, 632 So.2d 736, supra note 17.
31. See Smith v. Thomas, 214 So.3d 945 (La. App. 2d Cir. 2017). Doty also
relies upon Smith due to the nearly identical language, but Smith also relies on
Crabtree.
32. Crabtree, 632 So.2d 736, supra note 17.
33. Id. at 741.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 744.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 475.




          
        
   
         
           
       
      
           
      
           
        
         
        
       
       
 
           
             
          
          
           
            
           
              
   
         
           
            
        
          
                                                                                                         
    
      
      
      
             
        
3752019] DOTY V. GOAUTO
be relevant. Yet, it is stressed repeatedly.38 The question remains: is
physical manifestation a method of proving shock, or is it part and par-
cel of the claim? 
The court in Crabtree envisioned a scenario where absurd conse-
quences could have resulted had they ruled the other way:
Under State Farm’s construction, all injuries including bod-
ily injuries which ‘result from’ another’s bodily injury
would be subject to the single per person limit while all other
bodily injuries would be covered under the aggregate per ac-
cident limit. Thus, if an oncoming car hit Mr. Crabtree while
he was driving with Mrs. Crabtree, and the injury to him
caused him to drive off the road and hit a tree resulting in 
external, physical injury to Mrs. Crabtree, the latter’s injury,
under State Farm’s interpretation, would ‘result from’ the
former’s injury and therefore fall under the single bodily in-
jury limit.39 
Finally, the strongest argument the court makes is that the plaintiff
in Crabtree was injured in the same accident as her husband, the tort
victim.40 Thus, Crabtree reached its conclusion for three reasons: (1)
the vagueness of the term “bodily injury,” (2) the “absurd” conse-
quences resulting from this vagueness had they ruled for State Farm,
and (3) mental anguish could be its own bodily injury given the policy 
language.41 As noted in Smith, the discussion in Crabtree suggests that
the Supreme Court is not prepared to rule that Lejeune claims are or are
not derivative.42 
Doty is distinguishable from Crabtree because it did include the
limiting word “physical,” and yet this was not taken as dispositive. Fur-
ther, Doty’s policy language appears to be far less vague than the lan-
guage discussed in Crabtree.43 Doty emphasized the “temporal prox-
imity” to the event and allowed for recovery under the per-accident
38. Id.
39. Id. at 742.
40. Id. at 745.
41. Id. at 742.
42. Smith v. Thomas, 214 So.2d 945, 967, supra note 31.
43. See Crabtree, 632 So.2d 736, 739.




        
        
      
           
         
        
  
        
 
         
        
       
        
         
        
          
           
         
          
      
   
       
         
           
           
         
      
        
                                                                                                         
       
         
       
       
           
        
376 JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES [Vol. 12
limit,44 citing Smith. The court further reasoned that Lejeune claims
can constitute shock rising to the level of physical injury, citing dicta
from Crabtree. Doty appears to seize on Smith and Crabtree dicta
and hold that Lejeune is a physical bodily injury that is not derivative
of the initial tort victim’s injury, despite Crabtree’s suggestion that
State Farm could have changed the outcome by including this same
word.
B. How Dicta on Lejeune Claims Cases Have Affected Loss of
Consortium
The Supreme Court in Hill held that the wrongful death claims
of several adult children of the deceased could be subject to separate
per-person limits for each child. The policy language was identical
to Crabtree, and the limiting word “physical” was not used.45 The
court stated that the “test” to determine if their injuries were each 
their own separate bodily injuries turned on the severe and debilitat-
ing nature of the mental anguish.46 The Hill47 court did not discuss
the requirement that in order to be subject to the per-accident aggre-
gate limits, the bodily injury had to occur “in the same accident.”48 
Nor did they discuss whether the loss of consortium claim was de-
rivative in nature. This standard is arguably not compatible with any 
previously-discussed cases, particularly when analyzing dicta.
In Hebert, State Farm altered the language to “physical.” The
Supreme Court ruled that the wrongful death claims of the plaintiff,
who was not near the accident, were subject to the single per-person
limit on the injured relative, and not to the aggregate per-accident
limit. This was for two reasons: (1) the policy was very clear and 
specific, and (2) the difference between Lejeune claims and wrong-
ful death concerned temporal proximity to the accident and the fact
44. Doty, 251 So.3d 706, 710.
45. Hill, 935 So.2d 691, 694.
46. Id. at 695.
47. Id. at 694.
48. Hebert v. Webre, 982 So.2d 770, 776 (La. 2008) (distinguishing from
Hill and Crabtree by stating the policy language was clearer).




        
        
        
       
    
     
        
         
    
       
        
            
        
     
      
        
        
        
  
          
        
        
       
       
        
       
                                                                                                         
       
               
              
         
           
                
      
            
            
             
          
      
3772019] DOTY V. GOAUTO
that Lejeune claims seem to be considered more physical in nature.
The court distinguished its holding from Crabtree as follows:
(1) ‘bodily injury’ now means ‘physical bodily injury;’ and 
(2) ‘all emotional distress resulting from this bodily injury
sustained by other persons who do not sustain bodily injury’
is expressly included in ‘all injury and damages to others re-
sulting from this bodily injury.’ As we explained in Hill, the
type of injuries suffered by a wrongful death plaintiff are
emotional distress type injuries.49 
Thus, evolving jurisprudence seems to suggest that regardless of
whether a policy is ambiguous, Lejeune claims are distinguished 
from loss of consortium because (1) they are more physical and (2)
they occur in the same accident. Therefore, they are not derivative.
Problems arise when the policy is ambiguous, particularly with re-
spect to wrongful-death claims, because Hill suggested that vague
policy language might mean that even a wrongful death claim is not
derivative of one victim’s injury. This is problematic when consid-
ering the fact that this body of case law reasoning hinges on distin-
guishing the two.50 
It is clear that the Supreme Court is concerned with the policy
implications in limiting a Lejeune plaintiff’s claim, as they are seri-
ous, debilitating emotional distress claims.51 Further, the rules of in-
terpretation call for any ambiguities in the policy to be construed in 
the claimant’s favor, and the court will often stretch to seek cover-
age. However, confusion has arisen because the court has not
squarely addressed whether the Lejeune claim is derivative, while
49. Id. at 776.
50. See, e.g., Crabtree, 632 So.2d 736, see also Smith v. Thomas, 214 So.3d
945; Doty v. GoAuto 251 So.3d 706 (this body of case law spends considerable
time distinguishing between Lejeune claims and loss of consortium based upon 
the physical nature and the temporal proximity. However, the Supreme Court sug-
gests in Hill that where the policy is vague, loss of consortium might also rise to
level of physical injury that Lejeune does).
51. See Hebert v. Webre, 982 So.2d 770, 777 (explaining “grave policy con-
cerns” about fairness and public policy implications of the policy language that
limited separate and independent causes of action to a single “per person” limit.
However, it ultimately distinguishes the policy at issue from Crabtree and Hill
because it is much more specific).
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the loss of consortium claim is not. They also imply that Lejeune
claims, which are a result of shock, are more physical than loss of
consortium, although both concern emotional distress. Finally, to al-
low an inherently subjective “test” to govern whether the loss of
consortium claim is severe enough to rise to the level of bodily in-
jury does not fall in line with the former jurisprudential reasoning 
regarding Lejeune claims, and may preclude some from recovering 
if they outwardly manifest grief in a different manner. After Doty v.
GoAuto, these issues call for either legislative or jurisprudential clar-
ification so that claimants are clear on what they are entitled to, and
insurance companies will not be scrambling to adjust policy lan-
guage each time a new case is decided.
